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Competitiveness, Tax Base Erosion,
and the Essential Dilemma of Corporate Tax Reform
Kimberly A. Clausing ∗
Label contradicts reality for the U.S. international corporate tax
system. The U.S. system is typically labeled as a worldwide tax system with
a statutory rate of 35%, both uncommon features among our trading
partners. Yet these markers of the U.S. tax system do not accurately
describe reality, where multinational firms routinely face far lower
effective tax rates and little, if any, tax is collected on foreign income.
Understanding this discrepancy between label and reality is essential to
evaluate recent policy debates surrounding corporate inversions and the
competitiveness of the U.S. international tax system. Although there is an
essential policy tradeoff between “competitiveness” (an ill-defined term)
and corporate tax base protection, there is little evidence that U.S.
multinational firms have a competitiveness problem. However, new
evidence shows that corporate tax base erosion is a large and increasing
problem. There are several options for reform that would address
corporate tax base erosion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps fitting within a tradition of American exceptionalism, the
U.S. tax system is often described as sui generis. Observers repeatedly
lament that we are the only major country that employs a worldwide
system of taxation, taxing the foreign income of U.S. multinational
firms, and that we have one of the highest statutory tax rates in the
world. From this observation, it is a quick jump to argue that the
United States should adopt a territorial system of taxation that
exempts foreign income from taxation, combined with a lower
statutory rate.
This Article argues that such a characterization of the nature of
the current system as well as the desirability of particular reforms is a
misleading representation of reality. In particular, the U.S. tax system,
like those of our trading partners, is a hybrid system, with both
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territorial and worldwide components. Further, while the system is in
desperate need of reform, the rationale for reform is not what
adherents to the exceptionalism view hold. In particular, U.S.
multinational firms do not have a competitiveness problem due to the
features of our present tax system. However, our system does create
both perverse incentives and extensive tax base erosion; these issues
need to be addressed in future reforms. Ideal tax reforms would better
align the worldwide “label” of the U.S. tax system with the reality on
the ground, stemming corporate inversions and tax base erosion and
lowering statutory tax rates while raising effective tax rates.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: IS THE UNITED STATES SUI
GENERIS?
Perhaps the best description of the present U.S. international tax
system is that we have a “stupid territorial” regime. 1 In particular, U.S.
multinational firms pay little tax on foreign income, but engage in
inefficient behavior to generate that outcome, and tax base erosion is
rampant. Several features of our worldwide tax system generate this
“stupid territorial” outcome.
One of the biggest issues is deferral, which allows firms to
accumulate foreign income in low-tax countries without paying U.S.
tax until that income is repatriated. When income is repatriated, crosscrediting allows excess tax credits from high-tax countries to offset tax
that may be due on low-tax country income. 2 Also, under our system,
foreign tax credits can offset tax that would normally be due on royalty
income, further lowering the tax burden on foreign income. At the
same time, U.S. multinational firms have more foreign income than
ever before, in part due to shifting of profits out of the U.S. tax base.
U.S. multinational firms benefit from rules (such as “check the box”)
that facilitate the creation of stateless income, and profit shifting out
of the U.S. tax base has increased dramatically in recent years. 3

1. This is the assessment of President Obama’s Chief Economic Adviser Jason Furman.
See Jason Furman, Tax Council Policy Inst., Keynote Speech at Tax Council Policy Institute’s
Tax Symposium (Feb. 20, 2014) (transcript available at https:// www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/transcript_of_furman_keynote_speech_at_tax_counc
il_policy_institutes_tax_symposium.pdf).
2. Still, as the U.S. statutory tax rate has increased relative to declining foreign statutory
tax rates, multinational firms have fewer excess tax credits than in years past.
3. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 717–24 (2011)
(detailing elaboration on the generation of stateless income and related policy challenges);
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Given the parameters of the U.S. tax system just described, one
could easily argue that our system is a hybrid system. Indeed, most
major countries of the world have hybrid tax systems with territorial
and worldwide components. For example, many purportedly
territorial countries tax foreign income more heavily than the United
States system does, due in part to base protection laws that tax some
foreign income currently. Also, foreign tax credits are not available to
shield some types of foreign income, such as royalty income, from
domestic taxation.
In order to assess a country’s tax system, it is perhaps most useful
to think of all tax systems as lying on a spectrum between a pure
territorial system and a pure worldwide system. I have argued that
several criteria determine where on this spectrum countries are placed,
as summarized in Table 1. 4
Table 1: The Spectrum

1. Share of Foreign
Income Taxed

Pure
Territorial
System

Hybrid
(in between systems)

Pure
Worldwide
System

0%

=> Increasing =>

100%

2. Effective Tax
Burden on Foreign
Income

0%

=> Increasing =>

Domestic
Tax Rate

3.Tax Consequences
of Repatriation

Not Tax
Relevant

=> Increasing tax
influence => then
dropping to zero again

Not Tax
Relevant

4. Relative Incentive
to Earn Income in
Low-Tax Countries

High

=> Decreasing =>

None

Under a pure territorial system, foreign income is completely
exempt from taxation, giving multinational firms a large incentive to
earn income in (or shift income to) low-tax destinations. Under a pure

Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 107–09 (2011); see
also Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United
States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. (forthcoming Dec. 2016) (estimating profit shifting and its
effect on the U.S. tax base).
4. Portions of the text describing features of the table are excerpted from Kimberly
Clausing, Beyond Territorial and Worldwide Systems of Tax, 15 J. INT’L FIN. & ECON. 43 (2015).
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worldwide system, all foreign income is taxed currently at the
domestic tax rate, so multinational firms would have no incentive to
shift income to low-tax countries and repatriation would be
undeterred by tax burdens (since the tax would already be paid). Of
course, the United States is quite far away from the pure worldwide
end of the spectrum. Less appreciated, perhaps, is the fact that
purportedly territorial countries are also far away from the pure
territorial end of the spectrum.
First, consider the share of foreign income that is taxed. Many
territorial countries have controlled foreign corporation (CFC) laws
that seek to limit abusive tax avoidance by currently taxing foreign
income. The Joint Committee on Taxation provides detail on other
countries’ CFC laws. 5 Some countries (e.g., France, Germany, Italy,
and Japan) have very broad CFC laws that go beyond currently taxing
passive foreign income; active foreign income is also currently taxed,
when such income is insufficiently taxed in the source country. 6 The
French benchmark for insufficient taxation is less than half the French
rate; the Japanese benchmark is less than twenty percent. 7 Beyond
CFC laws, many territorial countries have other provisions aimed at
countering corporate tax base erosion that may affect the taxation of
foreign income, including thin capitalization (earnings stripping)
rules, which are widely used. 8 Indeed, many territorial countries tax
some foreign income.
The United States exempts much foreign income from tax, since
foreign income that is reinvested abroad can escape home taxation
indefinitely. Cross-crediting can also reduce the domestic taxation of
foreign income, and tax credits from dividends can offset tax that
would otherwise be due on other sources of foreign income, such as
royalty income. Thus, it is quite possible that a move to a territorial
system could raise rather than lower the share of foreign income that
is taxed. Further, U.S. multinational firms have become particularly
adept at generating stateless income, income that goes untaxed in
any jurisdiction.

5. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND
SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT
EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME 14-45 (Comm. Print 2011).
6. Id. at 22–30.
7. Id. at 29.
8. Id. at 14–15, 19, 28, 32, 36, 43.
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Second, consider the effective tax rates paid on foreign income. In
studies of multinational firm effective tax rates, there is no pattern that
distinguishes purportedly territorial countries from purportedly
worldwide countries. 9 Studies differ on where the United States fits
relative to peer countries. Avi-Yonah and Lahav find that U.S.
multinational corporations (MNCs) have effective tax rates that are
lower than MNCs based in the European Union. 10 Markle and
Shackelford find that the United States has relatively high effective tax
rates. 11 It is important to note that these calculations are more
complicated than they might seem, and effective tax rates vary a great
deal depending on methodological issues and individual firm
circumstances. 12 Indeed, many U.S. multinational firms have achieved
single digit tax rates, including Pfizer, prior to their
planned inversion. 13

9. See, e.g., Kevin S. Markle & Douglas A Shackelford, Cross-Country Comparisons of the
Effects of Leverage, Intangible Assets, and Tax Havens on Corporate Income Taxes, 65 TAX L. REV.
415, 416 (2012) (performing a regression analysis of the determinants of effective tax rates for
over 11,000 public corporations from 82 countries during the period 1988–2009 and finding
that firms resident in countries with a worldwide tax system have lower effective tax rates than
firms resident in countries with a territorial tax system, controlling for other factors); see also
Giorgia Maffini, Territoriality, Worldwide Principle, and Competitiveness of Multinationals: A
Firm-Level Analysis of Tax Burdens (Oxford CBT Working Paper No. 12/10, 2012) (analyzing
ORBIS firm-level data for over 3000 companies in 15 OECD countries over the period 2003 to
2007 and concluding that although worldwide countries do tend to have higher statutory rates
than territorial countries in this sample, controlling for statutory tax rates in the home country,
there is no difference in the effective tax rates of firms operating under a worldwide versus
territorial tax system).
10. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest U.S. and
EU Multinationals, 65 TAX L. REV. 375, 383 (2012).
11. See Markle & Shackelford, supra note 9, at 421.
12. For example, the General Accounting Office found that “[f]or tax year 2010 (the
most recent year with information available), profitable U.S. corporations that filed a Schedule
M-3 paid U.S. federal income taxes amounting to about 13 percent of the pretax worldwide
income that they reported in their financial statements.” GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: EFFECT TAX RATES CAN DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY
FROM THE STATUTORY RATE 1 (2013). The rate is higher if foreign and state and local income
taxes are included, at 17%. Id. If firms with losses are included, that raises the effective tax rate
averages further, to about 16% at the federal level, and about 22% inclusive of other taxes. Id.
13. Pfizer has a 7.5% effective tax rate. AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS, PFIZER’S TAX
DODGING RX: STASH PROFITS OFFSHORE (2015), http://www.americanfortaxfairness.org/
pfizers-tax-dodging-rx-stash-profits-offshore/. Many other companies have achieved
comparably low rates. See, e.g., Christopher Helman, What The Top U.S. Companies Pay In Taxes,
FORBES (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/01/ge-exxon-walmart-businesswashington-corporate-taxes.html.
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One clear point is that the United States raises very little additional
revenue by taxing the foreign income of its resident firms. In part, this
is due to the fact that: (1) foreign income is rarely repatriated in a
manner that generates foreign tax payments, and (2) tax credits from
dividends shield other foreign income from taxation. 14 Data from
other countries is less complete, but the U.K. Treasury estimated a
very low cost of moving to territorial taxation—less than one percent
of the corporate tax liability—due to the fact that very little revenue
was collected on repatriated dividends under their prior
worldwide system. 15
Third, consider repatriation incentives. Here, differences in tax
systems are larger. In theory, there should be no tax incentive affecting
repatriation decisions in either a pure territorial system or a pure
worldwide system. However, since actual worldwide systems typically
allow domestic tax on foreign income to be deferred until repatriation,
this creates a “lock out” effect whereby firms will be reluctant to
repatriate dividends from low-tax countries due to the tax cost
associated with bringing the money home. Absent deferral, this is not
an issue.
Still, even with deferral, there should not be a tax disincentive on
repatriation for mature firms. If the ultimate U.S. taxation of income
earned in low-tax countries is inevitable, then repatriation taxes should
not affect the decisions of mature firms regarding whether to reinvest

14. As Altshuler and Grubert report, using 2006 data, only $32 billion is collected on all
foreign source income, amounting to less than 4% of foreign income. Harry Grubert & Rosanne
Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International
Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 695 (2013).
“But the amount raised from dividends represents only a very small portion of this
revenue. Indeed, if dividends are removed from taxable foreign income total U.S. tax
revenue increases by about one billion. The dividends taxable on the margin after
credits are more than offset by the credits originating with dividends that currently
spill over to other income.” Id.
Gravelle makes a similar point using 2007 and 2008 data. Effective tax rates on all foreign
income were 7% in 2007 and 5% in 2008, but royalties were shielded from tax by excess credits.
Without this effect, tax revenues would have been higher. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42624, MOVING TO A TERRITORIAL INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 10–
11 (2012).
15. Li Liu, International Taxation and MNE Investment: Evidence from the UK Change
to Territoriality 6–7 (June 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Events/conferences/symposia/2015/liupaper4.pdf.
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funds abroad or repatriate. 16 The decision between reinvestment and
repatriation depends on the relative returns of the two investment
options; the tax cost of repatriating funds is incurred irrespective of
whether one reinvests the funds or repatriates them. 17 Yet in the case
of temporary changes in the tax cost of repatriation, this result no
longer holds. For example, if there is a temporary holiday for dividend
repatriation, one would expect increased repatriations during the
holiday and reduced repatriations in the surrounding periods. Further,
the mere expectation of holidays or changes in tax treatment can make
investors tax sensitive in their repatriation decisions.
Substantial evidence confirms that firms respond to these
temporary changes in tax costs. 18 Many argue that the current buildup
of un-repatriated foreign income by U.S. multinational firms is due to
anticipation of future holidays or, perhaps, U.S. adoption of a
territorial system. Under a territorial system, there should be no tax
disincentive affecting dividend repatriation. Yet there are caveats in
practice. As the Joint Committee on Taxation notes, many other
conditions might still distort repatriation decisions even if the United
States adopted a territorial system. 19
Finally, consider the incentive to earn income in low-tax countries.
While in theory, MNCs residing in territorial countries should face
greater incentives to earn income in low-tax countries (compared to
MNCs residing in worldwide countries), in practice, empirical work
16. David G. Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 J. PUB. ECON. 107,
115–18 (1985).
17. Kimberly A. Clausing, Tax Holidays (and Other Escapes) in the American Jobs Creation
Act, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 331, 333–35 (2005) (referring to result discussed in Hartman, supra note
16), provides a more detailed development of this point. Also note that the Hartman result only
applies to mature firms. Immature firms may have an incentive to underinvest in order to take
full advantage of deferral.
18. See generally DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40178, TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (2011).
19. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 84. Under a territorial system,
tax distortions to repatriation would occur under several possible conditions: if dividends were
not wholly exempt, if not all levels of foreign ownership generated exemption, or if foreign
earnings were required to have been subject to tax in order to qualify for exemption. In part for
these reasons, the predicted effects on repatriation from adoption of a territorial system are
typically small. Gravelle notes that the effects of the recent adoptions of territorial systems in
Japan and the U.K. were modest. GRAVELLE, supra note 14, at 14. Given the perceived
permanence of these changes, this could be due to the Hartman result; taxpayers are most
responsive to temporary changes that affect the relative cost of repatriating dividends at a
particular time. See Hartman, supra note 16 and related text.
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on this question has been difficult due to the problem of
distinguishing country tax systems when many countries have hybrid
systems. The evidence on this question is therefore mixed, although
meta-analyses by De Mooij and Ederveen confirmed a higher tax
elasticity for studies based on territorial tax systems. 20 In the 2003
meta-analysis, they conclude that studies using data from territorial
countries exhibit more tax responsiveness than studies using data from
worldwide countries, although this outcome does not persist if one
eliminates extreme findings. 21 The 2008 meta-analysis also finds that
studies based on territorial countries (162 of the semi-elasticities) have
higher elasticities than those based on worldwide countries (118 semielasticities). 22 The point estimate of the semi-elasticity difference
between the two groups of studies is about 1.0.
There are far fewer studies that consider how tax systems affect
income-shifting behavior. One exception is Markle; using data from
ORBIS over the period 2004–2008. Markle finds that multinationals
based in territorial countries shift more income than those in
worldwide countries. 23 The difference is limited to the subset of firms
that are financially constrained; there is no difference in income
shifting behavior for the subsample of firms that are not financially
constrained. Similarly, Dyreng and Markle find that financially
constrained multinational firms would increase outbound income
shifting if the United States were to adopt a territorial system. 24
III. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND CORPORATE INVERSIONS
As Part II demonstrates, most countries have a hybrid system of
international taxation where some types of foreign income are taxed
under some circumstances. The most important difference between
purportedly territorial and purportedly worldwide systems of taxation

20. Ruud A. de Mooij & Sjef Ederveen, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A
Synthesis of Empirical Research, 10 INT’L TAX & FIN. 673, 687 (2003).
21. Id.
22. Ruud A. de Mooji & Sjef Ederveen, Corporate Tax Elasticities: A Reader’s Guide to
Empirical Findings, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 680, 692 (2008).
23. Kevin Markle, A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated Income Shifting of Multinationals
in Territorial and Worldwide Countries 28 (Sept. 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1764031.
24. Scott D. Dyreng & Kevin Markle, The Effect of Financial Constraints on TaxMotivated Income Shifting by U.S. Multinationals 31 (May 14, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336997.

1656

1649

Competitiveness, Tax Base Erosion, and the Essential Dilemma

concerns repatriation incentives and the related problem of profit
shifting incentives.
Estimates indicate that about two trillion dollars are held by U.S.
corporations abroad (as permanently reinvested earnings), 25 about half
of which is in cash. 26 These profits have accumulated over time due to
booking income in low-tax countries. Un-repatriated earnings are
often held in U.S. financial institutions, and are thus available to U.S.
capital markets, but U.S. MNCs are constrained in their use of these
funds. These funds are assets of the firm that increase the firm’s
creditworthiness; however, firms cannot return the cash to
shareholders as dividends or share repurchases without incurring U.S.
corporate tax liabilities upon repatriation.
In the past, the multinational community succeded in lobbying for
a repatriation holiday as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004. Yet there is consensus among economists that, despite the
hopeful title of the legislation, the holiday did not increase jobs or
investment in the United States, but instead fueled dividends and
share repurchases. 27 This has made it difficult to argue for a repeat
performance of the holiday. Instead corporations have argued that the
United States should follow other countries and adopt a territorial
system of taxation, removing the repatriation tax and exempting
future foreign income from taxation.
If the United States were to move to a pure territorial system, it
would avoid the repatriation lock-out problem. However, this
approach would increase the already large incentive to shift profit
toward low-tax countries, since there would no longer be any
constraint on profit shifting due to anticipated tax burdens upon
repatriation. Indeed, the repatriation tax acts as a natural limit to the
amount of profit shifting multinational corporations may do, since
they fear accumulating large amounts of income abroad that cannot
be used for dividends or share repurchases without triggering U.S. tax.
Thus, eliminating the U.S. tax upon repatriation also eliminates the

25. Maxwell Murphy, Indefinitely Reinvested Foreign Earnings on the Rise, WALL ST. J.:
CFO J. (May 7, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2013/05/07/indefinitely-reinvestedforeign-earnings-on-the-rise/.
26. Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Inversions Must Be Stopped Now, WALL ST. J., July
21, 2014.
27. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 18, at 3; PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., REPATRIATING OFFSHORE FUNDS: 2004 TAX WINDFALL FOR
SELECT MULTINATIONALS (2011).
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remaining constraint on profit shifting behavior, turbocharging
incentives to shift profits abroad.
Note that there are other steps, beyond territoriality, that would
diminish the lock-out problem. As Hartman shows, a repatriation tax
that is presumed to be permanent would create much smaller lock-out
effects; 28 it is the prospect of more favorable tax treatment in the future
that makes firms reluctant to incur the tax costs of repatriation. Policy
uncertainty is a key part of the problem.
Of course, another way to handle repatriation lock-out would be
to simply tax foreign income currently by ending deferral. Since this
change would raise the tax burden on foreign income, a plausible
compromise might be to tax foreign income currently, but at a lower
rate, or through a system of minimum taxes.
Still, many multinational business interests favor a territorial
system of taxation, and if such a system is not forthcoming, some have
threatened to pursue corporate inversions, effectively “self-helping” to
the tax reform outcome they desire. For example, Carl Icahn, the
billionaire investor who recently pledged $150 million to launch a
super PAC aimed at such tax reforms, 29 claims that there will soon be
a flood of corporate inversions, unless Congress creates a more
“competitive” corporate tax code. 30
Indeed, the recent spate of corporate inversions had a clear motive.
Multinational firms want easier access to the $2 trillion in foreign
earnings held abroad. But equally important, corporate inversions ease
future profit shifting through earnings stripping. Earnings stripping
occurs when corporations use loans between the new foreign parent
and the U.S. affiliate to shift income out of the United States. This
happens by leveraging the U.S. company, through internal loans
within the multinational corporation, up to the limits set by the rules
of earnings stripping provisions in section 163(j) of the Internal
Revenue Code. 31 Inverted corporations will be able to shift income

28. See Hartman, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
29. Rebecca Ballhaus, Carl Icahn to Invest $150 Million in Super PAC, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
21,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/carl-icahn-to-invest-150-million-in-super-pac1445441825.
30. Carl C. Icahn, How to Stop Turning U.S. Corporations Into Tax Exiles, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/14/opinion/how-to-stop-turning-uscorporations-into-tax-exiles.html.
31. I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012).
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out of the United States without running afoul of these provisions.32
For example, with these sorts of strategies, estimates suggest a planned
inversion transaction could have saved Walgreens over $780 million in
taxes in one year alone. 33
Yet corporate inversions do not reveal anything about the tax
competitiveness of the U.S. multinational corporations that undertake
them, since these incentives to undertake corporate inversions are not
resulting from higher effective tax rates for U.S. based multinational
firms, nor from the fact that more foreign income is taxed. Instead,
inversions result from perverse features of the U.S. tax system—in
particular, the combination of deferral and limited earnings
stripping rules.
Systematic corporate tax reforms could address the problems of
repatriation lock-out and corporate inversions, among other key
reform objectives. Yet as we wait for systematic reforms, there are still
many policy tools that are capable of addressing inversions. 34 For
example, recent treasury regulations have made inversions more
difficult by addressing “hopscotch” loans and reducing some types of
earnings stripping. But more could be done, including increasing the
legal standard for a foreign affiliate to become a parent to fifty percent
ownership of the newly merged company. In addition, U.S.
corporations could be disallowed from moving abroad for tax
purposes if they remain managed and controlled in the United States
or if the corporation does not do significant business in the country it
claims as its new home.
Another area that could be revised in response to inversions is the
earnings striping rules under section 163(j). Since one of the key
drivers behind inversions is facilitating the subsequent shifting of
income out of the U.S. tax base, tightening these rules would reduce
the lure of inversion. Sullivan has cataloged many previous proposals

32. The same logic holds for foreign-headquartered firms more generally. See Stephen E.
Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice out of Corporate Expatriations, 144 TAX NOTES 473 (July
28, 2014).
33. Walgreens explored the possibility of a corporate inversion but decided against
expatriation. Seida and Wempe find evidence that firms’ effective tax rates decline following
inversion because of income shifting through changes in intercompany debt (see Jim A. Seida &
William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate
Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805 (2004)).
34. These are discussed in more detail in, KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING, TAX POLICY CENTER,
CORPORATE INVERSIONS (2014). This borrows from that discussion.
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to tighten these rules. 35 Such changes to earnings stripping provisions
would also help address the profit shifting problem more generally,
including in cases in which multinational firms have not inverted.
Finally, an exit tax would be a key anti-inversion policy tool. The
tax would be levied on repatriating companies, based on the U.S. tax
due on outstanding stocks of income that have not been repatriated.36
These anti-inversion measures are likely to be effective, and they
could also be enacted retroactively. 37 Of course, systematic corporate
tax reform could also address the tax incentives behind corporate
inversions, in addition to other even more important desiderata, such
as reducing the economic distortions under the present system and
protecting the corporate tax base. Part V evaluates options for reform
in detail.
IV. COMPETITIVENESS AND CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION
“Competitiveness” is a vague and ill-defined concept. In corporate
tax debates, the term is used to capture only a very narrow aspect of
competitiveness, the corporate tax facet of the overall ability of a
multinational firm to compete. Of course, there are many other
variables that affect a firm’s ability to compete, including, but not
limited to, the exchange rate, the firm’s financial constraints, and the
unique organization and internalization advantages of the particular
firm. In addition, the attractiveness of a particular country as a location
for production depends on much more than its corporate tax
environment: its market size, infrastructure, government services,
legal institutions, regulation, labor productivity, labor costs,
geography, and other factors. Indeed, these other aspects of a

35. See Martin Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Many Ways to Limit Earnings Stripping,
144 TAX NOTES 377 (July 28, 2014).
36. For elaboration, see Daniel Shaviro, Understanding and responding to corporate
(July
28,
2014),
inversions,
DANSHAVIRO.BLOGSPOT.COM,
http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2014/07/understanding-and-responding-to.html.
Shareholders still pay capital gains taxes under typical inversion deals since the merger creates a
realization event, but exit taxes would affect tax at the corporate level. Of course, many capital
gains are not taxed at the individual level if the shareholder is tax-exempt (e.g., nonprofits,
pensions, and annuities).
37. There are good arguments for retroactivity. For example, the prospect of retroactivity
would deter current plans for new inversions, thus avoiding situations in which firms rush to
complete inversions before legislation is enacted. Retroactivity would also reduce the “tilt” of
the playing field in favor of firms that had already successfully completed inversions before
the legislation.
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country’s (or a firm’s) competitiveness may be far more important for
national welfare than the tax facet of multinational firm competition.
Turning to the question of tax competitiveness, it is far from clear
that U.S. multinational firms are disadvantaged. Much foreign income
goes untaxed, and effective tax rates are on par with those in many
trading partner countries. Our multinational firms are also world
leaders in tax avoidance, and, as a result, they often achieve singledigit effective tax rates, making them the envy of the world in terms
of tax planning competitiveness. 38
By other conventional measure of competitiveness, U.S.
multinational corporations are healthy and thriving. As Figure 1
shows, corporate profits as a share of GDP in recent years are higher
than at any point in the last fifty years.

38. Edward D. Kleinbard, ‘Competitiveness’ Has Nothing to Do With It, 144 TAX NOTES
1055, 1057 (2014) (describing this phenomenon in detail).
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Figure 1: Corporate Profits as a Share of GDP, 1960–2014 39
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The United States is also home to a disproportionate share of the
Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s most important corporations.
As Figure 2 shows, the U.S. share of world GDP in 2014 (in dollar
terms) is 22%, and the U.S. share of GDP in PPP terms (which
accounts for different prices levels in different countries) is 16%. Yet
the U.S. share of the world’s biggest firms is far higher: 29% by count,
31% by sales, 35% by profits (consolidated worldwide), 24% by assets,
and 42% by market capitalization.

39. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and
RESERVE
BANK
ST.
LOUIS,
CCAdj)/Gross
Domestic
Product,
FED.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=cSh.
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Figure 2: 2014 Data on U.S. Share of Forbes Global 2000
Firms (and world GDP)
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Still, competitiveness concerns are often voiced as the key impetus
for moving the U.S. tax system toward a pure territorial system, or
absent that policy change, the necessity of “self-help” tax reform by
corporate inversion. 40 Those in the multinational community that
argue for a more “competitive” tax system are explicitly arguing for a
lighter tax burden to enable U.S. multinational firms to “compete”
with those based in other countries. Thus, when advocating for a
territorial system of taxation, business interests are certainly in favor
of moving toward the territorial end of the tax policy spectrum. But
they are unlikely to suggest a “tough” territorial system such as those
used by some of our trading partners since such a system would, on
net, increase the taxation of foreign income. Robinson notes that a
well-designed territorial system has potential to be as burdensome, if
not more so, on a U.S. multinational firm than the current poorly-

40. See Icahn, supra note 30.
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designed worldwide system. 41 Adopting the label of territoriality could
still move the U.S. system toward the worldwide end of the spectrum.
Systematic tax reforms will face a tradeoff between two essential
desiderata: corporate “competitiveness” and tax base protection. The
narrow version of competitiveness used in corporate tax policy debates
leads business interests to push for moves toward the territorial end of
the spectrum. Yet moves in this direction can exacerbate concerns
about efficient capital allocation and tax base protection. Such
concerns would favor moves toward the worldwide end of
the spectrum. 42
Indeed, a more “competitive” U.S. tax system will likely make the
already large corporate tax base erosion problem larger by increasing
the incentive to book income in low-tax countries due to the (even)
lighter tax burden that would be placed on those earnings. Yet the
evidence indicates a very substantial tax base erosion problem at
present. For example, my recent research suggests that, by 2012,
profit shifting will generate an annual revenue cost to the U.S.
government of between $77 and $111 billion. 43 Extrapolating to
2015 at a 5% growth rate, this implies losses that are likely in excess of
$100 billion per year. 44 Figure 3 shows how this cost has increased
dramatically in recent years. This increase is due to the increasing
foreign profits of U.S. multinational firms as well as the increased
discrepancy between U.S. tax rates and foreign tax rates, due to
steadily diminishing foreign tax rates. 45

41. See The U.S. Tax Code: Love It, Leave It, or Reform It: Hearing before the S. Comm. On
Finance, 113th Cong. 13 (2014) (statement of Leslie Robinson). Grubert and Mutti, for
example, design a territorial system that would result in an overall higher tax burden on income
generated in low-tax countries. HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS INCOME: DIVIDEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM 3–4 (2001). See
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 86 for a discussion of this point.
42. These concepts go back to Musgrave’s conceptions of capital export neutrality and
capital import neutrality. PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 108–38 (1969).
43. Clausing, supra note 3, at 2.
44. Kimberly Clausing, Profit Shifting and U.S. Corporate Tax Policy Reform,
WASHINGTON CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, May 2016, at 13 & n.12, http://cdn.
equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/05115111/051016-clausing-profitshifting.pdf.
45. The increase is not due to the increased tax sensitivity of foreign profits (since that
elasticity is held constant in this analysis).
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Figure 3: Estimates of Revenue Loss due to Income Shifting,
billions U.S.D (estimates using U.S. BEA gross income
series and direct investment earnings series)
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These estimates are explained in detail in another study by the
author. 46 That analysis uses survey data on U.S. multinational firms’
operations to estimate the size of the U.S. tax base absent profit
shifting. It does this by first estimating the tax sensitivity of U.S.
multinational firms’ taxable income to tax differences across countries,
controlling for other features of countries that may generate different
levels of corporate profits. It then calculates how much “excess” (or
deficit) profits are earned in low-tax (or high-tax) countries relative to
what profits would be without such profit shifting incentives. Profits
by affiliates of U.S. multinational firms in low-tax countries are shown
to be much higher than would be expected absent the incentive to
shift income to low-tax destinations. 47 Table 2 shows the countries
where the greatest profit shifting is occurring.

46. Clausing, supra note 3.
47. Id.
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Table 2: Key Locations of Profit Shifting, 2012 48
Country

Gross
Income
Reported,
$ billions

Estimate of
Gross Income
without
Shifting, $
billion

% of Total
Excess
Income in
Location

Netherlands
Ireland
Luxembourg
Bermuda
Switzerland
Singapore
UK (Caymans)
All Others Under 15%

172.3
122.3
96.1
79.7
57.9
42.4
40.9
188.6

33.0
23.6
15.0
9.9
14.6
10.5
8.7
89.8

23.0%
16.3%
13.4%
11.5%
7.2%
5.3%
5.3%
16.3%

Total Under 15%
All Others with Data 49

800
267

205
257

98.4%
1.6%

Then, a fraction (39% in 2012) 50 of this “excess” income in tax
havens and other low-tax countries is attributed to the United States
tax base, where it is assumed to be taxed at 30%. (This assumption
allows for some degree of base narrowing relative to the statutory tax
rate.) These estimates also take into account profit shifting by foreign
multinational firms. The estimates use the best publicly available data,
careful methodology, and conservative assumptions. 51 The estimates
are supported by similar findings by researchers at the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International

48. Id.
49. Note that the total of gross income in 2012 ($1,219 billion) is larger than the income
that is reported in particular countries analyzed here ($1,067 billion); some income is earned in
“other” countries that are not designated.
50. This is based on the share of foreign affiliate transactions that occur with the United
States compared to other foreign countries.
51. See Clausing, supra note 3, for a detailed discussion of the assumptions used in the
analysis, as well as alternative calculations that account for the range of estimates.
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Monetary Fund (IMF), Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT),
and elsewhere. 52
Indeed, even a look at the raw data is sufficient to illustrate the
large magnitude of the profit shifting problem. U.S. affiliate firm
profits were 645% of Bermuda’s GDP and 547% of the Cayman
Islands GDP in 2004. 53 As absurd as these numbers are, they increased
to 1,614% for Bermuda and 2,065% for the Caymans by 2010. Figure
4 shows the top ten locations of U.S. multinational firm affiliate gross
profits in 2012 (gross profits are net income with foreign income tax
payments added). 54

52. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Measuring
and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 - 2015 Final Report (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264241343-en (last visited Oct. 27, 2016); Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij & Michael
Keen, Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries (International Monetary Fund,
Working Paper 15/118, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1
5118.pdf; Mark P. Keightley & Jeffrey M. Stupak, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44013,
CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING (BEPS): AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DATA, (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44013.pdf; Tim Dowd, Paul
Landefeld & Anne Moore, Profit Shifting of U.S. Multinationals (Jan. 6, 2016) (forthcoming)
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711968; Gabriel Zucman, Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal
Wealth and Corporate Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 4, 121–48 (2014); GABRIEL ZUCMAN,
THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS, (Teresa Lavender Fagan
trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2015); and many earlier studies reviewed in de Mooij & Ederveen,
supra note 22.
53. Jane G. Gravelle, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40523, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 18, (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R40623.pdf. Similar stylized facts regarding the scale of the problem are reported by many
sources, including Mark P. Keightley, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN ANALYSIS OF WHERE
AMERICAN COMPANIES REPORT PROFITS: INDICATIONS OF PROFIT SHARING (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/1006/ and Robert S. McIntyre,
Richard Phillips & Pineas Baxandall, Offshore Shell Games: The Use of Offshore Tax Havens by
Fortune 500 Companies, OSPIRG (Oct. 2015), http://ctj.org/pdf/offshoreshell2015.pdf.
54. There is a lag in data availability, so at the time of analysis, 2012 was the most recent
year. Other recent years display similar patterns.
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Figure 4: Top Gross Income Countries, Affiliates of U.S.
Multinational Firms, 2012 (as share of Total Income) 55
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Of the top ten locations, seven of them are tax havens with
effective tax rates less than 5%: Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Bermuda, Switzerland, Singapore, and the UK Caribbean Islands
(including the Caymans). Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign
income taxes paid by all affiliates in a given country relative to their
income (net income plus foreign tax payments). These countries alone
account for 50% of all foreign income earned by affiliates of U.S.
multinational firms, but they only account for 5% of all foreign
employment of such firms. Further, the economic size of these
countries is quite small relative to this disproportionate profit; their
combined population is less than that of either Spain or California. 56

55. Clausing, supra note 3.
56. The data includes “income from equity investments”, some of which are counted
more than once if there are tiers of ownership within the same country. Unfortunately, with
existing data, it is not possible to account for this double-counting accurately. Still, one can use
an alternative data series, also from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, on direct investment
earnings. This series eliminates the possibility of double counting, but it is also incomplete, since
income from investments is excluded. Still, if one uses that series instead, the same seven
countries with low effective tax rates are in the top ten countries: Netherlands, Ireland, Bermuda,
Luxembourg, Singapore, the Cayman Islands, and Switzerland. Together, they account for 52%
of all foreign direct investment earnings.
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As noted above, estimates indicate that U.S. multinational firms
have accumulated over $2 trillion in permanently reinvested earnings
in low-tax locations, about half of which is held in cash. Due to the
large amounts of income booked in low-tax countries and havens, the
estimated costs of deferral have been increasing in recent years, and
the JCT now estimates this tax expenditure at $83.4 billion for 2014.
OMB estimates are somewhat lower, at $61.7 billion in 2014.57
The United States is not the only country with a corporate tax
base erosion problem. 58 Table 3 shows that other countries are also
likely to face important corporate tax base erosion problems:
Table 3: Estimates of Corporate Tax Base Erosion for
Selected Countries, 2012 59
Estimated
Profits in
17 lowtax
Countries,
$ billion

Effective
Tax Rate
(Combined
Statutory
Rate - 5%)

Excess
Income
Booked in
Low-tax
Countries,
$ billion

Revenue
Loss
(effective
tax rate *
share of
group
GDP *
$1,076b),
$ billion

Share
of all
Corporate
Revenue,
including
subfederal

Australia

67.7

25%

36.3

7.4

9%

Brazil

71.1

29%

46.4

13.5

17%

China

204.5

20%

79.7

32.7

11%

Czech R.

1.9

14%

0.4

0.6

8%

Denmark

7.2

20%

2.8

1.3

13%

Finland

5.3

20%

2.0

1.0

18%

France

90.5

29%

60.2

15.3

23%

Germany

80.4

25%

43.5

17.2

28%

Greece

2.2

15%

0.5

0.7

26%

India

55.0

27%

33.3

9.7

14%

57. This represents the estimated revenue cost associated with allowing deferral of the
U.S. tax on foreign income until it is repatriated. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014–2018, https://www.jct.
gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4663 and OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Fiscal
Year 2016 Analytical Perspectives of the U.S. Government, https://www. whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf.
58. Clausing, supra note 3.
59. Id.
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Indonesia

7.4

20%

2.9

3.6

8%

Italy

31.0

23%

14.3

9.0

16%

Japan

129.9

35%

105.7

39.8

18%

Norway

19.2

23%

9.2

2.3

4%

Poland

8.4

14%

1.8

1.3

13%

Portugal

8.2

27%

4.7

1.1

19%

Russia

86.7

15%

21.1

5.8

7%

S Africa

21.6

25%

11.3

1.9

9%

S. Korea

56.9

19%

20.8

4.5

10%

Spain

33.1

25%

17.7

6.6

24%

Turkey

10.6

15%

2.6

2.3

14%

U.S.

800.2

30%

545.3

93.8

26%

Total

1,836

1,076

279

20.1%

Note: For countries other than the United States, the tax rate is the
combined rate of federal and sub-federal rates (when countries have
sub-federal taxation); for the United States, I use the same
assumption as the above analysis. Corporate tax revenue data are not
available for all countries, and not all countries with estimates are
shown here. 60

This table is based on an extension of this analysis to other
countries without low tax rates, finding that the tax revenue cost from
profit shifting for these countries was about $280 billion in 2012.61
These large magnitudes of corporate tax base erosion were
instrumental in motivating recent Group of Twenty (G20) and
OECD efforts to address corporate profit shifting. After a flurry of
work in recent years and nearly 2000 pages of final project reports
(issued in October 2015), the OECD/G20 process has generated
recommendations that aim to better connect taxable profits to
economic activity.
Yet there are reasons to suspect that profit-shifting problems will
continue. Country adoption of the OECD suggestions is likely to be
60. Id.
61. See id. at 2. This analysis includes the United States and other countries that
headquarter a large number of sizable multinational firms. Due to data limitations, some of the
assumptions behind these estimates are more speculative than in the U.S. analysis. Most
developing countries are not considered in this analysis; see Crivelli, supra note 52, for an analysis
of the revenue costs of profit shifting for developing countries.
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partial and incomplete, and the suggestions themselves are also partial
and incomplete. The task faced by the OECD was difficult indeed;
establishing the source of income is a daunting task in a world where
firms are globally integrated and much economic value is intangible.
These difficulties are compounded by the large pools of financial
resources and talent being directed toward global tax minimization.
Small armies of accountants and lawyers are busy developing new
strategies for tax avoidance, often several steps ahead of government
treasuries as well as international efforts to improve tax base definition.
The OECD/G20 effort is certainly a helpful step toward greater
international cooperation in this vexing area, and some of the
recommendations, such as country-by-country reporting, are
significant. Still, it remains to be seen whether these steps will be
enough to stem the growing problem of tax base erosion due to profit
shifting. Eventually, countries may turn to more fundamental reforms.
V. REFORM OPTIONS
A. Why Bother?
Before discussing reform options, it is helpful to recall the
usefulness of the corporate tax in the broader tax system. Otherwise,
there would be the temptation to throw up one’s hands and allow the
corporate tax to wither away, leaving firms as tax competitive as
possible. Yet a healthy corporate tax is important for several reasons.
The corporate tax is an essential tool for taxing capital income.
Without a corporate tax, much income of profitable firms would go
untaxed since many equities are held in tax-exempt form. A majority
of individual passive income is held in tax-exempt form through
pensions, retirement accounts, life insurance annuities, and nonprofits, and new evidence suggests that perhaps as little as one-quarter
of U.S. equities are held in accounts that are taxable by the U.S.
government. 62 In addition, replacing corporate taxation with
individual taxation would either worsen the lock-in problem for capital

62. Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S.
Corporate Stock, TAX NOTES 926 (May 13, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000790-The-Dwindling-Taxable-Shareof-U.S.-Corporate-Stock.pdf; see also Leonard E. Burman & Kimberly A. Clausing, Is U.S.
Corporate Income Double-Taxed? (Nov. 2016) (working paper).
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gains or necessitate mark-to-market taxation. 63 Mark-to-market
taxation would raise liquidity concerns and increase the instability of
the tax base in times of market fluctuations. Further, without a
corporate tax, the corporate form could also provide a tax-sheltering
opportunity, particularly for high-income individuals. Sheltering
opportunities exist when corporate rates fall below personal income
tax rates and corporations retain a large share of their earnings.64
The corporate tax adds progressivity to the tax system. Corporate
taxes fall primarily on shareholders and capital-owners, not employees.
The best cross-country evidence shows no clear link between levels of
corporate taxation and wages. 65 A review of the prior literature and an
exhaustive examination of cross-country evidence is provided in other
articles by the author; no wage effects from corporate taxation were
found. 66 Even if the corporate tax were to fall partially on labor, it is
important to note that most alternative tax instruments to finance
government fall entirely on labor.
Further, capital income is far more concentrated than labor
income, and capital income has become a larger share of GDP in
recent decades, making the corporate tax an important part of the
progressivity of the tax system. 67 Since income inequality has increased
dramatically in recent years, 68 the equity case for taxing capital is
stronger. In addition, recent economic theory has buttressed the
63. Mark-to-market taxation would tax capital gains based on the current market value of
an asset, even if gains had yet to be realized.
64. JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34229,
CORPORATE
TAX
REFORM:
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
(2011),
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congressional-research-service-corporate-tax-reform-issuescongress/p26926. A reduced corporate tax rate of 27% would provide sheltering opportunities
for corporations that distribute less than 73% of their earnings. Id.
65. Cross-country evidence is needed to consider the open-economy tax incidence
mechanism that suggests capital will move in response to taxation, lowering the marginal product
of labor and wages in high-tax countries.
66. See Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. 433,
434 (2012); Kimberly A. Clausing, Who Pays the Corporate Tax in a Global Economy? 66 NAT’L
TAX J. 151, 152 (2013).
67. This is confirmed by several different sources documented in Jacobson and Occhino.
Margaret Jacobson & Filippo Occhino, Labor’s Declining Share of Income and Rising Inequality,
ECON. COMMENT., Sept. 25, 2012, 1, 1–2. Data collected from the BEA, the BLS, and the
CBO confirm these trends.
68. KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING, WASHINGTON CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH,
STRENGTHENING THE INDISPENSABLE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 21 (2016) (summarizing income
inequality trends), http://cdn.equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/12110
047/091216-corporate-tax.pdf.
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efficiency case for taxing capital. 69 This work suggests that the
economic rationale for robust capital taxation is alive and well. 70 In
models with real world features such as finitely-lived households,
bequests, imperfect capital markets, and savings propensities that
correlate with earning abilities, capital taxation has an important role
to play in an efficient tax system.
Henceforth, I will take as given the desirability of preserving the
corporate tax. The remainder of the Article will discuss fundamental
reform options for the corporate tax, focusing on three possible
reforms: 1) a move toward a purer territorial system, 2) a worldwide
consolidation system, and 3) formulary apportionment. 71
B. A Tough Territorial System?
As discussed above, 72 a territorial system could easily raise tax
burdens on foreign income for U.S. multinational firms. Yet the
multinational corporate community advocates for a territorial system
that would instead lighten the U.S. tax treatment of foreign income,
and the political process may indeed generate such an outcome. While
moving toward the pure territorial end of the tax system spectrum
would reduce any concerns about competitiveness and tax
disincentives for repatriation, it comes with a distinct downside. In
particular, exempting foreign income from taxation entirely would
dramatically relax the remaining constraint on shifting income abroad;
this downside has the potential to generate large revenue losses.
A tough territorial system would be a better compromise between
competing tax system goals, though it may generate political economy
concerns if one expects the “toughness” to be challenged or eroded
over time. Still, there are several ways to combine a territorial system
(that would remove the lock-out effect on repatriating dividends) with
69. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 419, 425–28
(2013) (reviewing recent economic theory).
70. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation, 81
ECONOMETRICA 1851 (2013); Emmanuel Farhi et al., Non-Linear Capital Taxation Without
Commitment, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 469 (2012); Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case
for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 165
(2011); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, A Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17989, 2012).
71. Discussion of formulary apportionment and worldwide consolidation borrows from
prior work produced by the author, including Clausing, supra note 17, at 21–29, and Clausing,
supra note 3.
72. See Supra Part II.
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base protection measures. Such measures would need to be carefully
designed so that they are not subject to work-arounds. Fleming,
Peroni, and Shay offer a careful analysis of some measures that would
be helpful including an updated Subpart F regime, 73 disqualification
from exemption for royalty income, 74 and a realistic allocation of
expenses to foreign source income. 75 Others have emphasized a
minimum tax approach, including the most recent proposals from the
Obama Administration. 76 Still, Fleming, Peroni, and Shay warn that
many recent proposals to move toward exemption have fundamental
weaknesses, 77 raising important concerns about base erosion 78 and
profit shifting. 79
Thus, while it is possible to design a “tough” territorial system,
caution is warranted about whether the requisite political will can be
mustered to make such a system suitably tough. Since the main push
for adopting a territorial system comes from business interests that
would oppose truly “tough” features of a territorial regime, the details
of any such proposal are crucial.
C. Worldwide Consolidation
Under worldwide consolidation discussed by the JCT and favored
by Kleinbard and Avi-Yonah, a multinational firm would be required
to consolidate the income earned across the parent firm and its
affiliates, and all income would be taxed currently, allowing a credit
for foreign taxes. 80 JCT summarizes the approach, applied to the
United States:

73. J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Designing a U.S.
Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury Is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397, 425–
28 (2012).
74. Id. at 431–34.
75. Id. at 451–52.
76. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 19 (2015), https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf.
77. Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Territoriality in Search of
Principles and Revenue: Camp and Enzi, 141 TAX NOTES 173, 174 (2013).
78. Id. at 191–203.
79. Id. at 189, 203 n.142.
80. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5; Edward D. Kleinbard, The
Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 101 (2011); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Hanging
Together: A Multilateral Approach to Taxing Multinationals 1–2 (U. Mich. Law & Econ.
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The U.S. group would include on its return the foreign
corporation’s items of income, gain, deduction and loss, the
character of such items would be preserved, and the foreign tax
credit would be retained.
[U]nder the consolidation approach, losses of foreign subsidiaries
would be included on the U.S. return . . . [and] apply only to U.S.
corporate shareholders of foreign subsidiaries. 81

One pragmatic issue concerns the degree of ownership that would
act as a threshold for the required consolidation: options discussed by
JCT include 80%, 50%, and 10%. 82
A worldwide consolidation approach has several benefits relative
to the current system: there would be less tax-motivated shifting of
economic activity or less book income to low-tax locations, since such
shifting would be less likely to affect a multinational firm’s overall tax
burden. 83 There would thus be fewer concerns about inefficient capital
allocation or corporate tax base erosion. Also, there would be no
“trapped cash” problem since income would be taxed currently.
However, depending in part on the corporate tax rate that would
accompany this change, the proposal may still raise competitiveness
concerns for those U.S. multinational firms with rising foreign tax
burdens under consolidation. Of course, if the U.S. corporate tax rate
were lowered substantially alongside this change, as proponents
typically suggest, this would reduce the concerns about
decreased competitiveness.
Some also worry that this proposal would put stress on the
definition of residence. Although some have argued that residence is
increasingly elective, 84 others contend that relatively simple legislation
would make it difficult to change residence for tax purposes.
Governments could require that corporate residence indicate the true
location of the “mind and management” of the firm; Avi-Yonah and

Working Papers, Paper No. 116, 2015), http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_
current/116.
81. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 100–01.
82. Id. at 101.
83. For firms with excess tax credits, there would still be an incentive to avoid earning
income in high-tax countries and to instead earn income in low-tax countries. Excess tax credits
are only likely if the average effective foreign income tax rate exceeds the residence country
tax rate.
84. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of US Corporate Residence, 64 TAX
L. REV. 377 passim (2011).
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Kleinbard suggest that a similar UK definition of residence would be
effective. 85 It is also feasible to develop anti-inversion measures along
the lines of those suggested above.
Finally, while there is little real-world experience with such a
system, it still falls within international norms since it prevents doubletaxation by offering foreign tax credits. The proposal could be
implemented without disadvantaging major trading partners, and
adopted unilaterally, though Avi-Yonah recommends that countries
take a multilateral approach. 86
This proposal has some advantages over simply ending deferral.
While eliminating deferral (presumably alongside a corporate tax rate
reduction) would entail some of the same tradeoffs illustrated here
(less distortion to repatriation decisions, reduced income shifting,
more efficient capital allocation, potential competitiveness concerns,
and a greater stress on the definition of residence), it would not truly
consolidate the affiliated parts of a multinational firm. Under
worldwide consolidation, for example, if losses are earned in foreign
countries, they can be used to offset domestic income.
D. Formulary Apportionment
Under formulary apportionment, worldwide income would be
assigned to individual countries based on a formula that reflects their
real economic activities. Some favor a three-factor formula (based on
sales, assets, and payroll), but others, including Avi-Yonah and
Clausing, have suggested a single-factor formula based on the
destination of sales. 87
The essential advantage of the formulary approach is that it is
provides a concrete way for determining the source of international
income that is not sensitive to arbitrary features of corporate behavior
such as a firm’s declared state of residence, its organizational structure,
or its transfer pricing decisions. Thus, if a multinational firm changes

85. Kleinbard, supra note 80, at 156 (2011); see Avi-Yonah, supra note 80, at 7-8.
86. Avi-Yonah, supra note 80, at 2.
87. E.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation
in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, in PATH TO PROSPERITY:
HAMILTON PROJECT IDEAS ON INCOME SECURITY, EDUCATION, AND TAXES 319, 319 (Jason
Furman & Jason E. Bordoff eds., 2008). As an example, if a multinational company earned $1
billion worldwide and had 30% of its payroll and assets in the United States but 60% of its sales
in the United States, its U.S. tax base would be $400 million under an equal weighted formula
(((.3+.3+.6)/3) * $1 billion), and $600 million under a single sales formula ((.6) * $1 billion).
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these variables, it would not affect its tax burden under
formulary apportionment. 88
Importantly, the factors in the formula are real economic activities,
not financial determinations. Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz; Slemrod and
Bakija; and Auerbach and Slemrod summarize a vast body of research
on taxation that suggests a hierarchy of behavioral response: real
economic decisions concerning employment or investment are far less
responsive to taxation than are financial or accounting decisions. 89 For
multinational firms, this same pattern is clearly shown in the data.
There is no doubt that disproportionate amounts of income
(compared to assets, sales, or employment) are booked in lowtax countries. 90
In this way, a formulary approach addresses aspects of both the
competitiveness and tax base erosion concerns. Firms have no
incentive to shift paper profits or to change their tax residence, since
their tax liabilities are based on their real activities. However, concerns
about efficient capital allocation may remain. Under a three-factor
formula, there is still an incentive to locate real economic activity in
low-tax countries, which raises concerns regarding efficient capital
allocation. This is somewhat less of a concern under a sales-based
formula, since firms will still have an incentive to sell to customers in
high-tax countries regardless. 91 Also, prior experience in the United
States, which uses formulary apportionment to determine the
corporate tax base of U.S. states, has indicated that formula factors
(payroll, assets, and sales) are not particularly tax-sensitive. 92

88. This assumes that the multinational firm has a taxable presence (i.e., nexus) in the
locations where it has employment, assets, and sales.
89. See Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal
Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3 (2012); JOEL SLEMROD & JON
BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES (5th ed. 2008);
Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 35 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 589 (1997).
90. E.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy, 62
NAT’L TAX J. 703, 720 (2009); Kimberly A. Clausing, Commentary, The Revenue Effects of
Multinational Firm Income Shifting, 130 TAX NOTES 1580, 1580 (2011); Clausing, supra note
3, at 1.
91. This is particularly the case for final goods. For intermediate goods, this is
more problematic.
92. See Kimberly A. Clausing, The U.S. State Experience Under Formulary Apportionment:
Are there Lessons for International Taxation?, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 353 (2016) for an in-depth
analysis of this question. Whether this tax-insensitivity would hold at higher corporate tax rates

1677

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

If all countries were to adopt formulary apportionment, there
would be few concerns about competitiveness. Multinational firms
would be taxed based on their real economic activities (in terms of
production and sales) in each country, so firms would be on an evenfooting with other firms (based in different countries) with similar
local operations. If only some countries adopt formulary
apportionment, it is uncertain what competitive effects would result;
such effects likely depend on the circumstances of particular firms.93
Ideally, formulary apportionment would be adopted on a multilateral
basis. However, if some countries adopt, there are mechanisms that
would encourage other countries to follow early adopters. 94
Another related approach is to utilize a formulary profit-split
method. The tax base would be calculated as a normal rate of return
on expenses, with residual profits allocated by a sales-based formula.
With careful implementation, such an approach might lessen concerns
regarding tax competition under a formulary approach. Elsewhere, I
provide more detail on the advantages and disadvantages of
formulary approaches. 95
VI. CONCLUSION
There is nearly universal agreement that the U.S. system of
international corporate taxation is in desperate need of reform. The
system is distortionary along many margins, and the U.S. government
raises less revenue (as a share of GDP) than most peer countries.
Foreign countries often have tax systems that appear quite different
than the U.S. tax system: they have lower statutory rates and they
purport to exempt foreign income from taxation. Still, if we look
beyond the labels, multinational firms face similar effective tax burdens
in the United States and elsewhere, and most major countries have

is an empirical question. Still, the forces of tax competition (mobility of production, competitive
pricing, etc.) are likely stronger between U.S. states than between foreign countries.
93. This also generates the potential for double-taxation or double non-taxation,
although this is also a problem under the present system.
94. Avi-Yonah, supra note 87, at 319–44 (explaining that there is a natural incentive for
countries to adopt formulary apportionment). In particular, once some countries adopt
formulary apportionment, remaining separate accounting (SA) countries would lose tax base,
since income can be shifted away from SA countries to FA countries without affecting tax
burdens in FA locations (since they are based on a formula). See id.
95. See generally id.; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al, Allocating Business Profits for Tax
Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009).
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hybrid systems of international taxation, with both territorial and
worldwide aspects.
Nonetheless, the U.S. system does have distinctive features: the
combination of deferral and insufficient base protection measures
generates vexing problems. These include “lock-out” effects that deter
firms from repatriating income to shareholders, due in part to hopes
for more favorable tax treatment in the future; there are also incentives
to undertake corporate inversions if such hopes appear futile.
Many observers emphasize the elements of the U.S. tax system
that are exceptional in order to argue for tax reforms that would bring
the U.S. system “in line” with those in other countries; such observers
often fear that U.S. multinational firms have a “competitiveness”
problem. Yet close inspection of markers of “competitiveness” indicate
that U.S. multinational firms are competitive, both in terms of narrow
notions of tax competitiveness and in general.
Still, the status quo also generates large revenue losses due to
profit shifting that likely exceed $100 billion per year at present. The
data suggest that corporate tax base erosion is a substantial and
increasing problem. Proposals to move the United States toward the
“pure territorial” end of policy spectrum would make this
problem worse.
Better reform options range from incremental proposals to a
wholesale rethinking of how we tax multinational firms. Incremental
changes that would improve the U.S. tax system include a lowering of
the statutory tax rate combined with serious corporate tax base
protection measures including tougher earnings stripping rules,
stricter anti-inversion provisions, and minimum taxes on foreign
income. Such measures would help stem corporate tax base erosion
and reduce the inefficiencies associated with a high statutory rate. Yet
none of these measures would address the fundamental problem of
determining the source of income in a global economy where
corporate tax-payers are agile and highly globally-integrated. Two
fundamental reform options show more promise in this regard:
worldwide consolidation and formulary apportionment. Regardless of
the reform path chosen, corporate tax reform should pay careful
attention to details. A healthy corporate tax has an important role to
play in the tax system for reasons of efficiency, equity, and revenue.
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